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MARTINEZ V. RYAN: A SHIFT TOWARD BROADENING
ACCESS TO FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
ABSTRACT

Prisoners seeking habeas corpus relief face numerous barriers imposed by the courts and Congress that prevent federal review of state
court convictions. In Martinez v. Ryan, the Supreme Court took a step
toward broadening access to federal habeas review. Although prisoners
generally may not assert claims in federal habeas proceedings that they
failed to raise in state proceedings, the Martinez Court ruled that prisoners may assert ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims in federal
court when failure to raise such claims in state proceedings was caused
by ineffective assistance of counsel in those proceedings.
This Comment argues that Martinez marks a shift away from the
previous trend of limiting federal habeas review and signals a new emphasis on ensuring that prisoners receive at least one full and fair adjudication of claims. However, the narrow holding does not ensure that prisoners will receive adequate representation in collateral proceedings or
have a fair opportunity to prevail on their claims in federal court. The
Court declined to guarantee a right to counsel in collateral proceedings,
meaning that prisoners without effective counsel will still face significant
challenges in vindicating their constitutional rights in federal habeas review. Additionally, some lower courts' narrow interpretations of the
Martinez holding indicate that the decision may have little impact beyond ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims. Martinez represents a
significant step toward ensuring that prisoners receive a full and fair review of constitutional claims, but the Court did not go far enough in easing the substantial barriers to accessing habeas corpus relief.
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INTRODUCTION

Federal habeas corpus allows state prisoners to seek relief in federal
court on the grounds that they were convicted or sentenced "in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."' In recent
decades, the courts and Congress have placed significant restrictions on
state prisoners' ability to access federal habeas review.2 Failure to comply with state procedural rules in postconviction proceedings results in
"procedural default," which precludes prisoners from raising defaulted
claims in federal court. 3 Prisoners do not have a constitutional right to
counsel in postconviction proceedings, 4 and procedural default is frequently the result of inadequate counsel in those proceedings.' In Martinez v. Ryan,6 the Supreme Court declined to extend the constitutional
right to counsel to prisoners in postconviction proceedings,' but ruled
that ineffective assistance of counsel in those proceedings may constitute
cause to excuse procedural default in limited circumstances.8

1. 28 U.S.C. §2254(a) (2006).
2. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253-2255, 2261-2266
(2006)). See generally John H. Blume, AEDPA: The "Hype and the "Bite," 91 CORNELL L. REV.
259, 265-66 (2006) (discussing the Supreme Court's "regime of systematic judicial limitations on
federal habeas corpus" from the 1970s to the 1990s).
3. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
86-87 (1977). See generally RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, 2 FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 26.1 (6th ed. 2011) (discussing procedural default doctrine).
4. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752 ("There is no constitutional right to an attorney in state postconviction proceedings." (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987))).
5. Hugh Mundy, Rid of Habeas Corpus? How Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Has Endangered Access to the Writ of Habeas Corpus and What the Supreme Court Can Do in Maples and
Martinez to Restore It, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 185, 186 (2011).
6.
132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
7. Id at 1315 ("[T]he Court of Appeals in this case addressed ... a question of constitutional
law: whether a prisoner has a right to effective counsel in collateral proceedings which provide the
first occasion to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial. . . . This is not the case, however, to
resolve [that question].").
8. Id ("This opinion qualifies Coleman by recognizing a narrow exception: Inadequate
assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner's
procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.").
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This Comment argues that although Martinez signals a landmark
shift toward broadening access to federal habeas review based on the
idea that prisoners should receive at least one full and fair review of constitutional claims, the limited holding does not ensure that prisoners will
be adequately represented by counsel or have a fair chance to prevail on
their claims in federal court. Part I of this Comment examines the rules
that limit state prisoners' ability to litigate constitutional claims in federal
habeas court and then discusses ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims
and Supreme Court precedent on the right to counsel in postconviction
proceedings. Part I summarizes the factual background, procedural history, and majority and dissenting opinions in Martinez. PartIII examines
the policy interests and legal reasoning behind the Martinez decision and
assesses the implications of providing a new avenue to overcome procedural default.
I. BACKGROUND

The courts and Congress have erected numerous barriers to federal
review of state court convictions. 9 This Part first examines the limitations
imposed by the exhaustion requirement and the doctrine of procedural
default. Second, it explores how concerns about federalism and promoting the finality of state court convictions have driven these restrictions on
federal habeas review. Third, the Part examines how ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims provide a narrow avenue for prisoners to
access federal habeas review. Fourth, the Part outlines the Supreme
Court's decision in Coleman v. Thompson'o, which firmly established
that the Constitutional right to counsel does not extend to habeas proceedings. 1'
A. Limiting Access to FederalHabeas Corpus
Federal habeas corpus allows state prisoners to petition for relief on
the grounds that they were convicted or sentenced "in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."l 2 The Supreme
Court's 1953 ruling in Brown v. Allen'3 established that state prisoners
with federal constitutional claims may petition for habeas relief in federal
courts, even if those claims have been heard by state courts.14 In a series
of decisions that began in the 1970s, however, the Supreme Court has
placed significant restrictions on state prisoners' ability to access federal
9.
See generally Blume, supra note 2, at 265-70 (discussing the Supreme Court's "regime of
systematic judicial limitations on federal habeas corpus" from the 1970s to the 1990s).
10.
501 U.S. 722 (1991).
i1.
Id.at752-53.
12.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006).

13.

344 U.S. 443 (1953).

14.
See id. at 484-86; Mundy, supra note 5, at 195-96 ("'Through its [Brown] ruling, the
Court opened the Writ to state prisoners who possessed federal constitutional claims, notwithstanding state adjudication of those claims.").
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habeas review.15 Prisoners must exhaust all state-court avenues for postconviction relief before petitioning in federal court.' 6 When a petition
includes multiple claims, the "total exhaustion" rule adopted by the
Court in 1982 requires that the entire petition be dismissed if it contains
even one unexhausted claim.' 7 Additionally, a prisoner's failure to comply with state procedural rules for asserting a constitutional claim in state
postconviction proceedings results in "procedural default," meaning that
federal habeas courts are precluded from reviewing the claim.18 Congress
codified these rules and enhanced other restrictions on federal habeas
review in the centerpiece of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).' 9
The doctrine of procedural default is rooted in a federal common
law rule that prohibits review of state decisions based on "adequate and
independent state grounds." 20 A state procedural rule is adequate if it is
regularly and fairly applied, 21 and it is independent if it is not so interwoven with federal law that applying it requires a determination of a federal
law question.22 Federal courts must determine whether a state procedural
rule is adequate and independent before dismissing a claim as procedur-

15. See, e.g., Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 1 (1992) (adopting a cause-and-prejudice
standard to prisoner's failure to develop facts in state court); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 470
(1991) (restricting federal courts' ability to review subsequent habeas petitions); Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (prohibiting federal courts from retroactively applying new rules of criminal procedure to grant habeas relief); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520-21 (1982) (adopting a "total
exhaustion" rule requiring federal courts to dismiss petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 539 (1981) (holding that presumption of correctness
applies to state appellate courts' factual findings); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 72 (1977)
(requiring petitioners to show cause and prejudice for procedural default); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 481-82 (1976) (precluding federal review of Fourth Amendment claims when state courts
offered a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claims). See generally Blume, supra note 2, at 26570 (discussing the Supreme Court's "regime of systematic judicial limitations on federal habeas
corpus" from the 1970s to the 1990s).
Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1886). See generally HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra
16.
note 3, §23.1 (discussing the exhaustion requirement).
17. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 522. See generally HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 23.5 (discussing petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims).
18.
See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991); Wainwright,433 U.S. at 86-87.
See generally HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 3 (discussing the procedural default doctrine).
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of28 U.S.C. §§
19.
2244,2253-2255, 2261-2266 (2006)).
See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 3, (discussing the "adequate and independent state
20.
procedural grounds" doctrine).
See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729. See generally HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 3, §
21.
26.2[d][i] (discussing the "adequacy" requirement).
22. See generally HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 26.2[d][ii] ("[S]tate law cannot be said
entirely to underpin the state court decision .. . if the answer to the state law question depends upon
the answer to some federal law question.").
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ally defaulted,2 3 but often give substantial deference to states in this area.24
To overcome procedural default, a petitioner must either show good
cause for failure to comply with state procedural rules and resulting prejudice, or show that dismissal of the claim would result in a "miscarriage
of justice."25 The standard for proving miscarriage of justice is notoriously difficult to meet and limited to cases where the prisoner is "actually
*
,26
innocent.
Thus, most prisoners who fail to properly raise constitutional
claims in state court must show cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default in order to have their claims heard in federal court. 2 7 Pursuant to Murray v. Carrier,28 cause requires a showing that an "objective
factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with
the State's procedural rule." 29 Historically, the Court has found cause to
overcome a default when a constitutional claim is so new that its legal
basis was not available at the time of the state proceeding, 30 when factual
basis for the claim was not reasonably discoverable at the time of the
state proceeding, 1 when state courts or officials hindered compliance

23. See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729 ("This Court will not review a question of federal law
decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of
the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.").
24.
Mundy, supranote 5, at 198 ("In reviewing challenges to the adequacy of state procedural
rules, the United States Supreme Court affords considerable deference to states as to both the substance and application of rules. Even a rule applied with 'seeming inconsistencies' by state court can
serve as an adequate and independent state ground. As a result of such broad judicial discretion, a
state procedural rule may be both 'firmly established' and 'regularly followed' even if its application
permits consideration of a federal claim 'in some but not other' cases. Further, the language of a
state rule need not be exacting to be deemed 'adequate."' (citations omitted)).
25.
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750 ("In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal
claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas
review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual
prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the
claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.").
26.
See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) ("The Carrierstandard requires the habeas
petitioner to show that 'a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who
is actually innocent.' To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show that it is more
likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence."
(quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986))); id. at 321 ("To ensure that the fundamental
miscarriage ofjustice exception would remain 'rare' and would only be applied in the 'extraordinary
case,' while at the same time ensuring that the exception would extend relief to those who were truly
deserving, this Court explicitly tied the miscarriage of justice exception to the petitioner's innocence.").
27.
See Mundy, supra note 5, at 199-200.
28.
477 U.S. 478 (1986).
29.
Id. at 479.
30.
See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) ("[W]e hold that where a constitutional claim is
so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel, a defendant has cause for his
failure to raise the claim in accordance with applicable state procedures.").
31.
Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 222 (1988) ("Ifthe District Attorney's memorandum was
not reasonably discoverable because it was concealed by Putnam County officials, and if that concealment, rather than tactical considerations, was the reason for the failure of petitioner's lawyers to
raise the jury challenge in the trial court, then petitioner established ample cause to excuse his procedural default. . . .").
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with the procedural rule, 32 or when the default was caused by ineffective
assistance of counsel at a proceeding in which the prisoner had a constitutional right to counsel. 33 The exhaustion requirement, the doctrine of
procedural default, and the difficulty of showing cause to excuse procedural default have all limited prisoners' ability to access federal habeas
review.
B. Federalismand Finality
Two related policy concerns have provided the principal justification for limiting federal habeas review: federalism and finality.34 Habeas
corpus raises concerns about federalism because it involves a federal
court overturning state criminal convictions. 35 As a result, the Supreme
Court has demonstrated a preference for deferring to state-court judgments on constitutional issues in state criminal cases.36 AEDPA codified
the idea that state courts, not federal courts, should be the primary adjudicators of constitutional challenges to state convictions.3 7
The Court has also emphasized the goal of promoting the finality of
state convictions.3 8 Finality is necessary, proponents argue, to conserve
judicial resources and to avoid routinely second-guessing the rulings of
state judges.39 It ensures that cases will not be reviewed long after evidence is lost and memories have faded, and allows courts to deliver a
conclusive sense of justice to victims. 4 0 Concerns about federalism and
finality have driven the Court and Congress to create an increasing number of restrictions on the scope of federal review of state convictions.4 1

32. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 671 (2004) ("[A] petitioner shows cause when the reason
for the failure to develop facts in state-court proceedings was the State's suppression of the relevant
evidence.").
33. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991) ("Where a petitioner defaults a
claim as a result of the denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel, the State, which is responsible for the denial as a constitutional matter, must bear the cost of any resulting default and the
harm to state interests that federal habeas review entails.").
34. See Todd E. Pettys, Killing Roger Coleman: Habeas,Finality,and the Innocence Gap, 48
WM. & MARY L. REv. 2313, 2335-39 (2007) (discussing how policy concerns about federalism and
finality have influenced federal habeas law).
35. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 443-44 (1963).
36.
Mundy, supra note 5, at 196 ("[S]ubsequent court rulings show increased deference to
state courts in resolving constitutional conflicts in criminal cases.").
37.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006) (mandating deference to state court rulings unless "contrary
to" Supreme Court precedent or "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts").
38. See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750 ("We now recognize the important interest in finality
served by state procedural rules, and the significant harm to the States that results from the failure of
federal courts to respect them.").
39. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 35, at 451 ("I could imagine nothing more subversive of a
judge's sense of responsibility, of the inner subjective conscientiousness which is so essential a part
of the difficult and subtle art ofjudging well, than an indiscriminate acceptance of the notion that all
the shots will always be called by someone else.").
40. See Pettys, supranote 34, at 2336-37 (citing Bator, supra note 35, at 452).
41. See Tom Zimpleman, The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Era, 63 S.C. L. REv. 425, 428
(2011) (discussing how concerns about finality have influenced restriction on federal habeas corpus).
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C. Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claims and Right to Counsel in
CollateralProceedings
The most commonly asserted claim in federal habeas petitions is ineffective assistance of counsel.4 2 The prevalence of this claim may be a
result of the restrictions put on federal habeas petitions because ineffective assistance of counsel can provide cause to excuse procedural default
of claims.43 The Court held in Carrierthat an attorney's failure to raise a
claim may only constitute cause if the error is so "egregious" as to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel." Thus, to avoid procedural default, a prisoner must show that the attorney's performance fell below the
standard guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.45
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the right to effective
counsel ends at direct appeal and that prisoners do not have a constitutional right to counsel in collateral challenges to their convictions. 46 Collateral review encompasses both federal habeas corpus review and state
postconviction review because these proceedings are outside the trial and
direct appeals process. 47 The Court has reasoned that counsel is not necessary in collateral proceedings because pro se petitioners have access to
the trial and direct-appeal records, and collateral review amounts to a
duplicative review of claims already raised on direct appeal with the assistance of counsel. 48
D. Coleman v. Thompson
In Coleman v. Thompson, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether procedural default in state collateral proceedings due to attorney
error precludes federal habeas review of a claim. 4 9 Petitioner Roger
Coleman was convicted of murder in Virginia and sentenced to death.so
On collateral review, a state court considered and rejected Coleman's
42.

See VICTOR E. FLANGO, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND

FEDERAL
COURTS
45-47
(1994),
available
at
http://www.ncsconline.orgfWC/PublicationsfKlIS StaFedHabCorpStFedCts.pdf (showing that 41%
of state habeas petitions and 45% of federal habeas petitions raise the claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel); NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S.

DISTRICT COURTS 28 (2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/219559.pdf
(showing that 81% of habeas petitions in capital cases and 50.4% of those in noncapital cases raised
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).
43. Zimpleman, supranote 41, at 446-47.
44. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence."); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984) (establishing standard for effective assistance of counsel).
46.
See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) ("There is no constitutional
right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings." (citing Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. I
(1989))); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610, 615 (1974) (holding that there is no right to postconviction counsel under due process or equal protection).
47.
See Zimpleman, supranote 41, at 426.
48.
See Ross, 417 U.S. at 614-16.
49.
See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 728-29.
50. Id. at 726-27.
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claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel." Coleman's postconviction attorneys appealed the decision but filed the notice of appeal one day
late.52 The state court dismissed the appeal, reasoning that the late filing
constituted procedural default.53 Coleman then petitioned for habeas relief in federal court, raising the claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel.5 4
The Court ruled that procedural default of a constitutional claim in
state court bars federal habeas review of that claim unless the petitioner
can show cause to excuse the default and resulting prejudice. 5 This holding overruled the previous rule from Fay v. Noia56 that failure to comply
with state procedural rules does not preclude a federal habeas court from
hearing a constitutional claim." The majority opinion emphasized "the
important interest in finality served by state procedural rules, and the
significant harm to the States that results from the failure of federal
courts to respect them."58
The Coleman Court also held that attorney error in state collateral
proceedings does not constitute cause to excuse procedural default because there is no constitutional right to counsel in collateral proceedings.59 Thus, Coleman's attorneys' day-late filing of the notice of appeal
in state court meant that federal courts were forced to dismiss Coleman's
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.60 With no further opportunity for
a review of his constitutional claims, Coleman was ultimately executed
in "the following year."6 1
II. MARTINEZ V. RYAN

A. Facts
Luiz Mariano Martinez was convicted in Arizona of sexual conduct
with an eleven-year-old child and sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment.62 In Arizona, prisoners may not raise a claim of ineffective as51.
Id at 727.
52. See id.
53. See id at 727-28.
54. See id at 728.
55. Id at 750 ("In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state
court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the
claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a
result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will
result in a fundamental miscarriage ofjustice.").
56. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
57. Id. at 426-27 ("[F]ederal court jurisdiction is conferred by the allegation of an unconstitutional restraint and is not defeated by anything that may occur in the state court proceedings. State
procedural rules plainly must yield to this overriding federal policy.").
58. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
59. Id. at 752-53.
60. Id. at 757.
61.
See Pettys, supra note 34, at 2313.
62.
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1313 (2012).
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sistance of trial counsel on direct appeal but must instead raise the claim
in state collateral proceedings. 6 3 If the claim is not raised in the first collateral proceeding, it is waived and cannot be raised in later proceedings. 4 Martinez's postconviction attorney began state collateral proceedings but did not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.6 5 Although the court gave Martinez forty-five days to file a pro se petition,
Martinez alleged his attorney never notified him of the collateral proceedings and did not advise him that he would forfeit the claim if he did
not file a pro se petition.66 Martinez did not respond to the deadline, and
the state trial court dismissed the collateral action.67
Represented by new counsel, Martinez began a second state collateral proceeding seeking to claim ineffective assistance of trial counsel.6 8
The state court dismissed his petition because he failed to raise the claim
in the first state collateral proceeding.
B. ProceduralHistory
With the assistance of his new attorneys, Martinez filed a habeas
petition in federal district court and again raised the claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel.70 Martinez argued that he had cause to excuse
the procedural default of that claim because his attorney in the first state
collateral proceeding was also ineffective.71 The federal district court
denied Martinez's habeas petition, reasoning that Martinez had not
shown cause because, under Coleman, an attorney's errors during collateral proceedings do not constitute cause to excuse procedural default. 72
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, adding that there is no constitutional right to
effective counsel in collateral proceedings.73 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari on the issue of whether a prisoner has a constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel in the first collateral proceeding when that

63.

State v. Spreitz, 39 P.3d 525, 527 (Ariz. 2002).

64.

See ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.2.

65.

Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314.

66.

Id

67.
68.

Id
Id.

69.

Id

70.
Id at 1313.
71.
Id. at 1314-15 ("He could overcome this hurdle to federal review, Martinez argued,
because he had cause for the default: His first postconviction counsel was ineffective in failing to
raise any claims in the first notice of postconviction relief and in failing to notify Martinez of her
actions.").
72.
Id at 1315 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753-54 (1991)).
73.
Id ("The Court of Appeals relied on general statements in Coleman that, absent a right to
counsel in a collateral proceeding, an attorney's errors in the proceeding do not establish cause for a
procedural default. Expanding on the District Court's opinion, the Court of Appeals, citing Coleman,
noted the general rule that there is no constitutional right to counsel in collateral proceedings."
(citing Martinez v. Schriro, 623 F.3d 731, 736 (9th Cir. 2010))).
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proceeding provides the first opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel.74
C. Majority Opinion
In a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court
held that procedural default would not prevent a federal court from hearing the merits of Martinez's habeas petition if his first collateral review
attorney was ineffective. 7 5 The Court avoided answering the constitutional question of whether a prisoner has a right to effective counsel on
collateral review.76 Ilstead, the Court narrowly framed the issue as
whether an attorney's errors in an "initial-review collateral proceeding"
could qualify as cause to excuse a procedural default of an ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim. 77 Justice Kennedy used the term "initialreview collateral proceeding" to refer to state "collateral proceedings
which provide the first occasion to raise a claim of ineffective assistance
at trial."78 The Court held that when a state requires ineffectiveassistance claims to be raised in collateral proceedings instead of on direct appeal, "a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from
hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that
proceeding was ineffective."79
The Martinez Court framed this holding as a narrow qualification of
the general rule from Coleman that prisoners have no right to effective
counsel in collateral proceedings.80 The Court emphasized the distinct
nature of initial-review collateral proceedings.8 1 Unlike other collateral
proceedings in which an attorney's error merely precludes further review
of claims that a court has already addressed, an attorney's error in initialreview collateral proceedings means "that no state court at any level will
74. Id. at 1326 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We granted certiorari on, and the parties addressed
their arguments to, the following question: 'Whether a defendant in a state criminal case who is
prohibited by state law from raising on direct appeal any claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel, but who has a state-law right to raise such a claim in a first post-conviction proceeding, has
a federal constitutional right to effective assistance of first post-conviction counsel specifically with
respect to his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim."' (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (No. 10-1001))).
75. Id at 1320 (majority opinion) ("Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not
bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the
initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.").
76. Id at1315.
77. Id. at 1313 ("While petitioner frames the question in this case as a constitutional one, a
more narrow, but still dispositive, formulation is whether a federal habeas court may excuse a procedural default of an ineffective-assistance claim when the claim was not properly presented in state
court due to an attorney's errors in an initial-review collateral proceeding.").
78. Id at 1315.
79. Id. at 1320.
80. Id. at 1315 ("This opinion qualifies Coleman by recognizing a narrow exception . . .
81.
Id at 1316.
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hear the prisoner's claim." 82 The Court characterized initial-review collateral proceedings as "the equivalent of a prisoner's direct appeal as to
the ineffective-assistance claim" and noted that an attorney's error on
direct appeal may be cause to excuse procedural default. 83
The Court used the importance of initial-review collateral proceedings to distinguish Martinez from Coleman.84 In Coleman, the postconviction attorney error was a failure to file a timely appeal on a claim that
had already been heard in the first collateral proceeding. In Martinez,
the alleged attorney error was a failure to raise the claim in the first collateral proceeding.86 Unlike the petitioner in Coleman, Martinez's claim
was never heard at any level.
The Court also emphasized the particular significance of ineffective-assistance claims to the adversarial system, stating that "[t]he right
to effective assistance of counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in our
justice system."" Proving an ineffective-assistance claim "often require[s] investigative work and an understanding of trial strategy," which
presents practical difficulties for prisoners who do not have an effective
postconviction attorney.89 When such claims cannot be raised on direct
appeal where prisoners have a right to effective counsel, prisoners are
significantly hindered in their ability to assert their constitutional right to
effective counsel at trial. 90
The Court predicted that allowing federal courts to hear the merits
of this type of habeas claim would not place significant strain on state
resources. 9t The Court noted that many states already appoint counsel for
ineffective-assistance claims, and procedural default on those claims can
still be enforced when postconviction attorneys perform adequately. 92
States that choose not to appoint counsel in initial-review collateral pro82.
Id
83.
Id. at 1317.
84.
Id. at 1316 ("Coleman, however, did not present the occasion to apply this principle to
determine whether attorney errors in initial-review collateral proceedings may qualify as cause for a
procedural default. The alleged failure of counsel in Coleman was on appeal from an initial-review
collateral proceeding, and in that proceeding the prisoner's claims had been addressed by the state
habeas trial court. As Coleman recognized, this marks a key difference between initial-review collateral proceedings and other kinds of collateral proceedings. When an attorney errs in initial-review
collateral proceedings, it is likely that no state court at any level will hear the prisoner's claim."
(citation omitted)).
85.
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 727-28 (1991).
86.
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314.
87.
See id. at 1316.
88.
Id. at 1317.
89.
Id.
90.
Id. at 1318 ("By deliberately choosing to move trial-ineffectiveness claims outside of the
direct-appeal process, where counsel is constitutionally guaranteed, the State significantly diminishes prisoners' ability to file such claims.").
91.
Id at 1319.
92.
Id. ("It is likely that most of the attorneys appointed by the courts are qualified to perform,
and do perform, according to prevailing professional norms; and, where that is so, the States may
enforce a procedural default in federal habeas proceedings.").

280

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1

ceedings may defend against ineffective-assistance claims on the merits
in federal court.93
According to Justice Kennedy, the holding would have a limited
impact on habeas jurisprudence.94 It did not contradict Coleman, the
Court reasoned, because Coleman did not involve an initial-review collateral proceeding and had never been applied to this type of situation.
The Coleman rule would still control in all circumstances other than initial-review collateral proceedings that provide the first opportunity to
raise an ineffective-assistance claim. 9 6 The Court emphasized that the
holding did not establish a constitutional right to counsel in collateral
proceedings. 97 Rather, it was merely an equitable judgment "that the initial-review collateral proceeding, if undertaken without counsel or with
ineffective counsel, may not have been sufficient to ensure that proper
consideration was given to a substantial claim."98 In these particular circumstances, a prisoner has cause to excuse a procedural default so that
federal courts may hear the merits of the claim.99
D. DissentingOpinion
In his dissent joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia accused the
majority of contradicting habeas precedent and violating principles of
federalism and finality.'" Justice Scalia observed that the Court's holding ignored the "external-factor requirement" of cause for procedural
default.' 0 1 He reasoned that habeas precedent firmly established that attorney error is not an external factor unless the prisoner has a constitutional right to effective counsel. 10 2 Because there is no constitutional
right to effective counsel in collateral proceedings, attorney error is not
an external factor and thus cannot constitute cause to excuse procedural
93. Id. at 1320 ("[A] State [may] elect between appointing counsel in initial-review collateral
proceedings or not asserting a procedural default and raising a defense on the merits in federal habeas proceedings.").
94. Id. at 1319-20.
95. Id. at 1319 ("Coleman itself did not involve an occasion when an attorney erred in an
initial-review collateral proceeding with respect to a claim of ineffective trial counsel; and in the 20
years since Coleman was decided, we have not held Coleman applies in circumstances like this
one.").
96. Id. at 1320 ("The rule of Coleman governs in all but the limited circumstances recognized
here. The holding in this case does not concern attorney errors in other kinds of proceedings, including appeals from initial-review collateral proceedings, second or successive collateral proceedings,
and petitions for discretionary review in a State's appellate courts. It does not extend to attorney
errors in any proceeding beyond the first occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise a claim of
ineffective assistance at trial . . . ." (citations omitted)).
97. Id at 1319.
98. Id. at 1318.
99. Id. at 1320 ("Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must
be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas
court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.").
100. Id at 1327 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101.
Id. at 1324.
102. Id.
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default.'0 3 He also suggested that the holding was incompatible with a
number of habeas cases that rejected any right to counsel on collateral
review, including in circumstances where collateral proceedings presented the first opportunity to raise certain claims.'1"
Justice Scalia suggested that the Court's holding would have "precisely the same" consequences as finding a constitutional right to effective counsel in collateral proceedings. 0 5 He predicted that the holding
would force states to appoint counsel in collateral proceedings because,
although states could still legally choose not to appoint counsel, the practical consequences of that choice would be litigating the merits of every
ineffective-assistance claim in federal court. o0Even states that did appoint collateral counsel would be forced to defend the effectiveness of
that counsel in federal court.107 Because procedural default would no
longer automatically keep claims out of federal court, states would have
to defend criminal convictions through "years-long federal retrial."',
Justice Scalia also predicted that the future implications of the holding
would be broad because it would be difficult to limit the new rule to ineffective-assistance claims.09 He criticized the Court's holding for imposing significant costs on states and preventing states from achieving finality in criminal convictions. 0
III. ANALYSIS
Martinez v. Ryan marks a landmark shift toward easing the procedural barriers that prevent prisoners from accessing federal habeas review. The Martinez holding represents a departure from the previous
trend in habeas decisions restricting federal review of state convictions
and signals a new emphasis on ensuring a full and fair adjudication of
constitutional claims. However, the Court's refusal to recognize a consti103.
Id. at 1325.
104.
Id. at 1326 ("In Pennsylvaniav. Finley ... we stated unequivocally that prisoners do not
'have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions.' . . .
[I]n announcing a categoricalrule in Finley, and then reaffirming it in Giarratano,the Court knew
full well that a collateral proceeding may present the first opportunity for a prisoner to raise a constitutional claim." (citations omitted) (quoting Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987))).
105. Id. at 1321.
106. Id at 1322 ("[W]hoever advises the State would himself be guilty of ineffective assistance
if he did not counsel the appointment of state-collateral-review counsel in all cases-lest the failure
to raise that claim in the state proceedings be excused and the State be propelled into federal habeas
review of the adequacy of trial-court representation that occurred many years ago. Which is to say
that the Court's pretended avoidance of requiring States to appoint collateral-review counsel is a
sham.").
107. Id. at 1322-23.
108. Id at 1323.
109. Id. at 1321 ("[N]o one really believes that the newly announced 'equitable' rule will
remain limited to ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel cases. There is not a dime's worth of difference in principle between those cases and many other cases in which initial state habeas will be the
first opportunity for a particular claim to be raised .....
110. Id. at 1327.
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tutional right to effective counsel in collateral proceedings and lower
courts' efforts to limit the application of Martinez mean that petitioners
will still face significant challenges in asserting their constitutional rights
in federal court.
A. A Shift Away from FederalismandFinality Toward a Full andFair
Adjudication of Claims
Although the Court began its legal analysis by affirming that concerns about federalism and finality guide habeas jurisprudence,"' Martinez is a significant departure from previous decisions" 2 that relied on
these policy interests to restrict federal habeas review. Federalism and
finality provided the principal justification for restrictive procedural default rules-exemplified by Coleman and AEDPA-that kept federal
courts from reaching the merits of most habeas petitions.1 3 The Martinez
decision affirms that promoting finality for state convictions is an important goal but recognizes that finality interests do not insulate unfair
state processes from federal review. As previous scholarship has recognized, in the absence of a fundamentally fair state postconviction process, federal habeas review must proceed unencumbered and de novo.11 4
Although never explicitly stated, the idea that prisoners should have
at least one full and fair opportunity to litigate claims is a resounding
theme throughout the majority opinion.' This theme reflects the proceduralist model of habeas review endorsed by commentators like Professor Justin Marceau." 6 The proceduralist model emphasizes that access to
federal habeas review should depend on whether state procedures provided a full and fair review of claims."17 The right to a full and fair op111.
Id. at 1316 (majority opinion) ("Federal habeas courts ... are guided by rules designed to
ensure that state-court judgments are accorded the finality and respect necessary to preserve the
integrity of legal proceedings within our system of federalism.").
112. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) ("We now recognize the
important interest in finality served by state procedural rules, and the significant harm to the States
that results from the failure of federal courts to respect them."); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
88 (1977) ("A contemporaneous-objection rule may lead to the exclusion of the evidence objected
to, thereby making a major contribution to finality in criminal litigation.").
113. See Pettys, supranote 34; Zimpleman, supra note 41, at 438.
114. See, e.g., Justin F. Marceau, Don't Forget Due Process: The Path Not (Yet) Taken in §
2254 Habeas Corpus Adjudications, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 1-2 (2010) [hereinafter Marceau, Don't
Forget Due Process] ("Where the aggregate of available state proceedings fail to provide a meaningful corrective process such that federal constitutional issues are not 'fully and fairly' adjudicated, it
is necessary for the federal courts to review the federal claims de novo."); Justin F. Marceau, Deference and Doubt: The Interaction of AEDPA § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(I), 82 TUL. L. REV. 385, 441
(2007) ("[T]he text, structure, and purpose of § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1) compel the conclusion that
state findings still must comport with minimum standards of procedural regularity . . . .").
115. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318 ("Allowing a federal habeas court to hear a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel when an attorney's errors (or the absence of an attorney)
caused a procedural default in an initial-review collateral proceeding acknowledges, as an equitable
matter, that the initial-review collateral proceeding, if undertaken without counsel or with ineffective
counsel, may not have been sufficient to ensure that proper consideration was given to a substantial
claim.").
116. See, e.g., Marceau, Don't Forget Due Process,supra note 114, at 7-9.
117. See id.
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portunity to litigate constitutional claims comes from the constitutional
right to due process."' In his discussion of the origins of the "full and
fair" right, Professor Marceau has noted that even Professor Paul Bator, a
leading proponent of limiting federal habeas review, "concluded that it is
not an exaggeration to say that 'the essence of . . . due process [is] to
furnish a criminal defendant with a full and fair opportunity' to litigate
constitutional claims concerning the validity of his detention or sentence."119 When state procedures fail to provide a full and fair adjudication of constitutional claims, due process requires that prisoners have
access to a full and fair review of claims in federal habeas court.120
The petitioner in Martinez faced a situation analogous to other examples of state procedural unfairness that habeas scholars have argued
should permit unrestricted federal habeas review. For example, Professor
LaFave has reasoned that "federal habeas relief should be available with
respect to a [constitutional] claim if the state court by some stratagem or
procedural device unfairly prevented the petitioner from presenting argument on legal issues."'21 Similarly, proceedings are not full and fair if
prisoners are not allowed to develop facts necessary to prove their
claims.12 2 When unfair state processes prevent prisoners from litigating
constitutional claims, it seems procedurally unfair to force prisoners to
forfeit claims.123 Forcing a prisoner to forfeit a claim that was procedurally defaulted because of his attorney's mistakes in an initial-review collateral proceeding raises similar concerns about due process. Given the
complex nature of ineffective-assistance claims, the Court in Martinez
recognized that "[t]o present a claim of ineffective assistance at trial in
accordance with the State's procedures, . . . a prisoner likely needs an

effective attorney." 24 The Martinez Court concluded that ineffective
assistance of counsel at an initial-review collateral proceeding likely
deprives the prisoner of "fair process and the opportunity to comply with
the State's procedures and obtain an adjudication on the merits of his
claims."l 25

118.
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . ."); see Marceau, Don't Forget Due Process, supra note 114, at 18
("[D]ue process mandates that every prisoner receive at least one full and fair review of his constitutional claims, either through direct or collateral proceedings, and either in state or federal court."
(citing Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 298-99 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring))).
119. Marceau, Don't Forget Due Process, supra note 114, at 7-8 (quoting Bator, supra note
35, at 456).
120. Id at 7.
121.

§

6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

11.7(g), at 497-98 (4th ed. 2004).
122. See Marceau, Don't Forget Due Process,supra note 114, at 34-36 (discussing deficiencies in fact-finding procedures as a violation of due process).
123.
See id at 34 ("[W]hen the state process is guided by procedures, formal or informal, that
render the process inhospitable to basic fairness, due process requires uninhibited federal review.").
124.
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012).
125.
Id.
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In this context, the Court's decision to allow ineffective assistance
of initial-review collateral counsel to qualify as cause to overcome procedural default seems compelled by due process. The Court recognized
that ineffective counsel on collateral review will likely deprive prisoners
of a meaningful opportunity to have their claims reviewed on the merits. 126 Thus, without effective postconviction counsel, state collateral
proceedings do not offer prisoners the full and fair adjudication of constitutional claims required by due process. When ineffective assistance of
postconviction counsel prevents a state court from reaching the merits of
a claim, federal habeas review presents the only opportunity for prisoners
to have their claims heard. The Court held that, under these circumstances, ineffective assistance of collateral counsel qualifies as cause for procedural default, allowing prisoners an opportunity to litigate claims in
federal habeas court. This avenue for overcoming procedural default is
meant to guarantee that prisoners receive at least one full and fair review
of their constitutional claims, either in state postconviction proceedings
or on federal habeas review.
The Martinez Court's focus on giving prisoners a meaningful opportunity to litigate constitutional claims is a landmark development in
habeas law. The habeas remedy has been so eviscerated in recent decades
that it has become extremely difficult to bring a successful petition in
federal court, even for prisoners with meritorious claims.12 7 In Martinez,
the Court finally took a step toward balancing the interest in finality with
allowing prisoners with meritorious constitutional claims to have their
day in court.
B. A Missed Opportunityto Guaranteethe Right to Counsel on Collateral Review
Although Martinez expanded prisoners' access to federal habeas review, the Supreme Court avoided deciding the issue of whether prisoners
have a constitutional right to counsel in collateral proceedings.1 28 In doing so, the Court missed an opportunity to extend the constitutional right
to counsel to all proceedings that present the first opportunity to raise
important constitutional claims.
The Court's own reasoning points to the absurdity of differentiating
between collateral review and direct appeal in circumstances where collateral review presents the first opportunity to raise a claim. Martinez
rejects the flawed assumptions that the Supreme Court has previously
relied upon to deny prisoners the right to counsel in postconviction pro-

Id. at 1316 ("When an attorney errs in initial-review collateral proceedings, it is likely that
126.
no state court at any level will hear the prisoner's claim.").
127. See KING ET AL., supra note 42, at 52 (showing that only 0.35% of federal habeas petitions in non-capital cases resulted in a grant of relief for any claim).
128. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1313.
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ceedings. 129 The Martinez Court recognized that the trial and directappeal records provide little assistance to pro se petitioners asserting a
claim for the first time in collateral proceedings.1 30 The Court acknowledged that when collateral proceedings provide the first opportunity to
raise a claim, an initial collateral review is more like a direct appeal than
a duplicative review of claims. 131
Given the similarities between initial-review collateral proceedings
and direct appeal, it makes little sense to continue to deny prisoners the
right to counsel on collateral review. The need for postconviction counsel is especially pressing when the claim at issue is ineffective assistance
of trial counsel. The Martinez Court admitted that "[t]o present a claim
of ineffective assistance at trial in accordance with the State's procedures, . . . a prisoner likely needs an effective attorney." 3 2 When a prisoner's only chance to assert a vital constitutional claim depends on access to an effective attorney, it is difficult not to conclude that basic notions of "fairness and equality" require a right to counsel to initial-review
collateral proceedings.' 3 3
C. Anomalies Createdby Avoiding the ConstitutionalQuestion
To avoid ruling on the constitutional issue, the Court opted instead
to create an avenue for prisoners to overcome procedural default. 13 4 The
Court's decision to expand cause for procedural default instead of finding a constitutional right to collateral counsel raises several unresolved
questions.
First, as the dissent noted, the majority opinion does not explain
how the holding is consistent with the "external factor" requirement for
cause.13 5 Carrierand Coleman established that an attorney's error is not
a factor external to the defense and thus cannot constitute cause for procedural default unless there is a constitutional right to effective coun129.
See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 614 15 (1974) ("[R]espondent ... received the
benefit of counsel in examining the record of his trial and in preparing an appellate brief on his
behalf for the state Court of Appeals. . . . We do not believe that it can be said, therefore, that a
defendant in respondent's circumstances is denied meaningful access to the North Carolina Supreme
Court simply because the State does not appoint counsel to aid him in seeking review in that court.
At that stage he will have, at the very least, a transcript or other record of trial proceedings, a brief
on his behalf in the Court of Appeals setting forth his claims of error, and in many cases an opinion
by the Court of Appeals disposing of his case. These materials, supplemented by whatever submission respondent may make pro se, would appear to provide the Supreme Court of North Carolina
with an adequate basis for its decision to grant or deny review.").
130. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317 (citing Halbert v. Michigan, 454 U.S. 605, 617 (2005)).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See Ross v. Moffiti, 417 U.S. at 621 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The right to seek discretionary review is a substantial one, and one where a lawyer can be of significant assistance to an
indigent defendant. It was correctly perceived below that the 'same concepts of fairness and equality,
which require counsel in a first appeal of right, require counsel in other and subsequent discretionary
appeals."' (quoting Moffit v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650, 655 (4th Cir. 1973))).
134. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315.
135. Id. at 1324 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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sel.' 36 To justify the creation of an exception to the general rule from
Coleman, the Court focused on the special importance of ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims.' 37 But the significance of the claim fails to
explain how an attorney's error in collateral proceedings can constitute a
"factor external to the defense" 38 when a prisoner has no constitutional
right to an attorney. The majority opinion did not even mention the external factor requirement, much less attempt to resolve the questions
raised by Justice Scalia in the dissenting opinion. Martinez leaves the
future of the external factor requirement uncertain. It is unclear whether
the external factor requirement will continue to be an obstacle to overcoming procedural default as it was Carrierand Coleman, or whether it
will be ignored in the future as it was in Martinez.
Martinez also creates a potential anomaly for prisoners whose
claims have been denied on the merits in state court. When a prisoner
fails to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim due to ineffective counsel at an initial-review collateral proceeding, Martinez allows the prisoner to litigate the claim in federal court.139 However, it is
unclear what effect Martinez will have when a prisoner's postconviction
counsel raises the claim but litigates it poorly. In such circumstances, the
claim has technically been exhausted instead of procedurally defaulted.
Unlike the situation in Martinez where a claim was not raised at all,
when postconviction counsel raises the claim but does so in an ineffective manner, it is unclear whether the prisoner will be entitled to relief. It
fails logic to treat less favorably prisoners whose lawyers act deficiently
in litigating a claim than prisoners whose lawyers fail entirely to raise a
claim.
This problem is potentially amplified by the Court's recent decision
40
in Cullen v. Pinholster.1
Federal habeas review of ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims is now limited to the record available to the
state court that ruled on the merits of the claims.141 When a postconviction attorney's incompetence causes the claim to be denied on the merits
in state court, the prisoner will be unable to develop new facts in support
of the claim in federal court because of Pinholster. Thus, Martinez may
136.
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) ("There is no constitutional right to an
attorney in state post-conviction proceedings. Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings." (citations omitted)); Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478, 488 (1986) ("So long as a defendant is represented by counsel whose performance is not
constitutionally ineffective under the standard established in Stricklandv. Washington, we discern no
inequity in requiring him to bear the risk of attorney error that results in a procedural default. Instead, we think that the existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether
the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to
comply with the State's procedural rule." (citation omitted)).
137. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320.
138.
Cartier,477 U.S. at 488.
139.
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320.
140.
131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).
141.
Id. at 1398.

2012]

MARTINEZ V RYAN

287

provide an opportunity for relief to prisoners who never raise claims at
all but not for prisoners whose claims are denied due to ineffective postconviction counsel.
D. Will Martinez Force States to Appoint CollateralCounsel?
In its discussion of the advantages of expanding cause for procedural default instead of recognizing a constitutional right to collateral review
counsel, the Martinez Court emphasized that its decision would not force
states to appoint collateral counsel. Instead, states could choose "between
appointing counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings or not asserting a procedural default and raising a defense on the merits in federal
habeas proceedings."1 42 But the dissent predicted that the Court's holding
in Martinez would have the same practical effect on states as finding a
constitutional right to counsel on collateral review.14 3 Justice Scalia reasoned that, faced with the prospect of litigating ineffective-assistance
claims on the merits in federal court, states will choose to appoint counsel in collateral-review proceedings.'"4
If the dissent is correct, then this is a positive step toward ensuring
broader access to counsel for prisoners with constitutional claims. However, Justice Scalia's prediction ignores the difficulty of presenting a
habeas petition and prevailing on the merits in federal court. 45 Litigating
habeas claims in federal court will certainly be more costly for states
than the pre-Martinez option of winning a quick summary victory by
asserting procedural default. But given the uphill battle that prisoners
face in prevailing on their claims, states might decide that it is more costeffective to win a relatively easy victory on the merits in federal court
than to appoint counsel in every state initial-review collateral proceeding.
The practical barriers to filing a successful habeas petition mean that
states will likely still be able to avoid appointing counsel for prisoners in
collateral proceedings, knowing that pro se prisoners will have little
chance of petitioning successfully in federal court.
State courts in Delaware and Kentucky interpreting Martinez have
confirmed in unpublished opinions that prisoners still do not have a right

142. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1319-20.
143. Id. at 1321-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Moreover, even if today's holding could (against
all logic) be restricted to ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims, it would have essentially the
same practical consequences as a holding that collateral-review counsel is constitutionally required.").
144.
See id. at 1322 ("[W]hoever advises the State would himself be guilty of ineffective
assistance if he did ndt counsel the appointment of state-collateral-review counsel in all cases-lest
the failure to raise that claim in the state proceedings be excused and the State be propelled into
federal habeas review of the adequacy of trial-court representation that occurred many years ago.
Which is to say that the Court's pretended avoidance of requiring States to appoint collateral-review
counsel is a sham." (footnote omitted)).
145.
See KING ET AL., supra note 42, at 52 (showing that only 0.35% of federal habeas petitions in non-capital cases resulted in a grant of relief for any claim).
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to counsel on collateral review in those states. 14 6 Even though there is no
constitutional right to counsel in collateral proceedings, it remains to be
seen whether states will decide to appoint counsel, as Justice Scalia predicted, in order to assert procedural default for federal habeas claims.
Because Martinez does not guarantee prisoners the right to counsel
in initial-review collateral proceedings, the Court's holding does not go
far enough in ensuring that prisoners with meritorious claims will prevail
on those claims. Prisoners who had no counsel in collateral proceedings
will no longer have their claims dismissed due to procedural default, but
they have little chance of succeeding on the merits without the assistance
of counsel. As the Court recognized, proving an ineffective-assistanceof-counsel claim presents special difficulties for pro se petitioners.14 7 It
requires "investigative work,"48 which is virtually impossible for petitioners to accomplish from prison, and "an understanding of trial strate150
gy,"l49 a subject that is beyond the reach of many petitioners. Although
the Martinez decision may lead to fewer petitions being dismissed for
procedural default, the likelihood of ultimate success will remain small
for pro se petitioners raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel.15' Because prisoners still have no right to counsel in collateral
proceedings, Martinez is inadequate to ensure that prisoners with meritorious ineffective-assistance claims will have a real chance to prevail on
the merits in court.
E. Applying Martinez to Other Types of Claims
Another unresolved question is whether Martinez's expansion of
cause will be applied to claims other than ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. According to the Court, the Martinez holding is limited to prisoners asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.15 2 But
the dissent suggested that the holding will not remain limited to ineffective-assistance claims because they are no different in principle from

146. State v. Finn, No. 0801037592, 2012 WL 2905101, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. July 17, 2012)
("Martinez does not change Delaware's longstanding rule that defendants are not entitled postconviction relief counsel."); Denny v. Commonwealth, No. 201 1-CA-001232-MR, 2012 WL 2604599,
at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. July 6, 2012) ("Although we find the logic ... from the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Martinez persuasive, the Kentucky Supreme Court has specified that there is no
right to the effective assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings in Kentucky, and we are
bound by that decision.").
147.
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See Mundy, supra note 5, at 212.
151. See KING ET AL., supra note 42, at 52 (reporting that in a random sample of 2,384 federal
habeas petitions in non-capital cases, only 7 resulted in a grant of relief, and only I of these grants
was based on an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim).
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320.
152.
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claims based on prosecutorial misconduct, exculpatory evidence, or impeachment of prosecutorial witnesses.' 53
Courts accord special significance to the role of attorneys in the adversarial system,154 and the Martinez majority emphasized the particular
importance of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims to justify creating
a narrow exception to Coleman.'55 However, courts also accord great
importance to the fairness of the adversarial fight.156 Brady claims, which
involve allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in withholding exculpatory evidence from the defense, may be just as central to protecting the
fairness of the justice system.'15 Whether Martinez remains limited may
depend on whether courts decide that ineffective assistance of counsel
constitutes a more heinous violation of a defendant's rights than a cheating prosecutor.
On the other hand, it may not matter whether, as Justice Scalia suggested, ineffective assistance of counsel is indistinguishable in principle
from other important claims. Although the Martinez rule could logically
be expanded to other claims, courts inclined to limit habeas relief will
likely take the Martinez opinion at face value in order to deny relief on
other types of claims. In Ibarrav. Thaler,'58 a recent Fifth Circuit case,
the petitioner argued that Martinez should be applied to excuse his default of two claims in addition to his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim.' 59 The Fifth Circuit summarily denied relief for these two claims,
stating that "Martinez, by its terms, applies only to ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claims."'60 Similarly, a federal district court in
Washington decided that Martinez cannot be applied to Brady claims. 6 '
153. Id at 1321 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[N]o one really believes that the newly announced
equitable' rule will remain limited to ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel cases. There is not a
dime's worth of difference in principle between those cases and many other cases in which initial
state habeas will be the first opportunity for a particular claim to be raised: claims of 'newly discovered' prosecutorial misconduct, . . . claims based on 'newly discovered' exculpatory evidence or
'newly discovered' impeachment of prosecutorial witnesses, and claims asserting ineffective assistance of appellate counsel." (citation omitted)).
154. See Zimpleman, supra note 4 1, at 449-52 (discussing how ineffective assistance of counsel functions as a "safety valve" to overcome procedural default).
155. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317 ("A prisoner's inability to present a claim of trial error is
of particular concern when the claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel. The right to the
effective assistance of counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in our justice system.").
156. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("Society wins not only when the
guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice
suffers when any accused is treated unfairly."); see also Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and
ConstitutionalMirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 McGEORGE L. REv. 643, 643 (2002).
157.
See Sundby, supra note 156 ("Brady is often heralded as the Supreme Court case that
granted the criminally accused a constitutional right to discovery. Like the other members of the
[Warren Court] pantheon, the Brady Court announced its holding with a strong tone of moral authority.").
158.
687 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2012).
159.
Id. at 224.
160.
Id.
161.
Hunton v. Sinclair, No. CV-06-0054-FVS, 2012 WL 1409608, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 23,
2012).
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Several other district courts have interpreted Martinez as limited to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.1 62 If Courts continue to read Martinez narrowly and follow the letter of the majority opinion, Martinez
will do nothing to lower the barriers that prevent prisoners from raising
other types of procedurally defaulted claims in federal court.
F. Lower Courts' Efforts to DistinguishMartinez
Some courts have also limited the application of Martinez by narrowly interpreting the definition of "initial-review collateral proceeding." 63 The Fifth Circuit in Ibarraruled that Martinez did not apply because under Texas rules, an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim can
be raised at trial on a motion for a new trial and also on direct appeal.16
Because Texas, unlike Arizona, does not require that the ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim be raised only on collateral appeal, the Ibarra court ruled that the collateral proceeding did not constitute the first
opportunity to raise the claim as required by Martinez.16 5 Similarly, a
federal district court in California held that Martinez did not apply because California prisoners are required to bring ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claims on collateral appeal only when matters outside the trial
record must be considered; otherwise, they may raise the claim on direct
appeal.166 Other courts have ruled that Martinez does not apply in Arkansas, Alabama, and Tennessee because those states allow prisoners to
raise ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal. 6 1

162. See Felix v. Cate, No. CV I1-7713-JHN (RNB), 2012 WL 2874398, at *10 (C.D. Cal.
May 8, 2012) ("[T]he narrow exception to Coleman recognized in Martinez applies only to defaulted
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims."); Dunn v. Norman, No. 4:11CV872 CDP, 2012 WL
1060128, at *5 n.2 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 29, 2012) (finding Martinez inapplicable to procedurally defaulted claim of insufficient evidence at trial because it is "not a claim that trial counsel was ineffective").
163.
See Dansby v. Norris, 682 F.3d 711, 728-29 (8th Cir. 2012); Ibarra, 687 F.3d at 224;
Arthur v. Thomas, No. 2:01-CV-0983-LSC, 2012 WL 2357919, at *8-9 (N.D. Ala. June 20, 2012);
Felix, 2012 WL 2874398, at *9-10; Leberry v. Howerton, No. 3:10-00624, 2012 WL 2999775, at
*1-2 (M.D. Tenn. July 23, 2012).
164.
Ibarra,687 F.3d at 227 ("Ibarra is not entitled to the benefit of Martinez for his ineffectiveness claims, as Texas procedures entitled him to review through counselled motions for new trial
and direct appeal.").
165.
Id.
166.
Felix, 2012 WL 2874398, at *10 ("[U]nlike Arizona, California does not have a procedural rule requiring that all ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims be raised by way of a collateral
attack in a writ of habeas corpus, and not on direct appeal. Rather, it is only when the determination
of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim necessitates consideration of matters outside the
record on appeal (e.g., the existence or nonexistence of a tactical basis for trial counsel's course of
conduct) that California requires the claim to be raised on habeas corpus.").
167.
Dansby, 682 F.3d at 729 ("Martinez does not apply here, because Arkansas does not bar a
defendant from raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal."); Arthur,
2012 WL 2357919, at *9 ("The second major difference between Arthur's situation and that of the
petitioner in Martinez is that Arthur could have obtained a review of his ineffective-assistance-oftrial-counsel claims with the aid of counsel different from his trial counsel in his direct appeal, as
well as in his first collateral challenge."); Leberry, 2012 WL 2999775, at *I ("Martinez is not applicable to this case. . . . [I]n Tennessee, 'there is no prohibition against litigation of ineffective counsel
claims on direct appeal, as opposed to collateral proceedings."' (quoting State v. Monroe, No.
E2011-00315-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 2367401, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 22, 2012))).
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These courts ruled Martinez inapplicable because state rules do not
bar prisoners from raising ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal,
but the courts did not consider the feasibility of raising those claims on
direct appeal. In Hearn v. Thaler,'68 the petitioner argued that the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Ibarra rendering Martinez inapplicable in Texas
should not apply to claims that rely on facts outside the trial record. 169
The petitioner, who was sentenced to death, noted that in capital cases "it
is not practicable for the defendant to develop the evidence to support
ineffective assistance of counsel claims through a motion for new trial,"
and without factual development these claims "will not receive meaningful review in the direct appeal.", 70 Under these circumstances, the petitioner argued that his first collateral proceeding was an initial-review
collateral proceeding as defined by Martinez because it presented the
first practical opportunity for a capital defendant to raise an ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim. 7 ' The court rejected this argument and interpreted Ibarra as binding precedent that Martinez does not apply in
Texas under any circumstances.172
These lower-court decisions suggest that Martinez will have limited
applicability in states that allow prisoners to raise ineffective-assistance
claims in motions for new trial or on direct appeal, despite the reality that
collateral proceedings often present the first feasible opportunity to raise
such claims. This limited application of Martinez is inconsistent with the
Martinez Court's emphasis on ensuring that every prisoner gets one full
and fair opportunity to litigate ineffective-assistance claims-a point
articulated powerfully by the dissent in Ibarra.173 The dissent noted that
collateral proceedings are the "preferred and encouraged" venue for raising ineffective-assistance claims in Texasl74 and that "there clearly are
instances where a collateral proceeding will be the 'first occasion' to
legitimately raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in
Texas." 7 5 Although prisoners may technically be allowed to raise ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims in a motion for new trial or on
direct appeal, these methods will rarely represent a fundamentally fair
opportunity to vindicate those claims.' 76 The Martinez Court noted that
the "[a]bbreviated deadlines to expand the record on direct appeal may
not allow adequate time for an attorney to investigate the ineffective168.
No. 3:12-CV-2140-D, 2012 WL 2715653 (N.D. Tex. July 9, 2012).
169.
Id. at *4.
170.
Id. ("[Hearn] argued that the only opportunity to include evidence that is not already in the
trial record is by a motion for new trial that must be filed within 30 days of judgment, usually by
trial counsel and before the record is transcribed.").
171.
See id
172.
Id. at *3-4.
173.
Ibarra v. Thaler, 687 F.3d 222, 228-29 (5th Cir. 2012) (Graves, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
174.
Id. at 229.
175.
Id.
176.
See id. at 228-31.
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assistance claim." 7 7 The Ibarradissent concluded that "it is not equitable to find that [the prisoner] has defaulted on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because his claimed ineffective counsel did not prematurely raise said claim when clearly not practicable." 7 8
When state procedures make collateral proceedings the only feasible place to raise an ineffective-assistance claim, it seems unfair to enforce a procedural default simply because the prisoner was technically
allowed to raise the claim on direct appeal. Due process requires at least
one full and fair opportunity to litigate constitutional claims. 7 9 If state
procedures do not offer a meaningful opportunity to do so, whether on
direct appeal or in collateral proceedings, Martinez allows federal habeas
courts to excuse a prisoner's procedural default. Ibarra and other decisions are wrong to limit Martinez's applicability without considering
whether state procedures actually afford prisoners a full and fair opportunity to have their claims heard on the merits. These decisions contravene the Court's purpose in Martinez of giving every prisoner a meaningful opportunity to litigate ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.
G. The Future of Coleman
Two decades after Coleman established that an attorney's mistakes
in collateral proceedings do not qualify as cause to overcome procedural
default, the Martinez Court shifted course to carve out a "narrow exception" to this rule. 80 It remains to be seen to what extent Martinez will
limit the reach and impact of Coleman in the future.
Despite the majority's insistence that Martinez constitutes a narrow
exception instead of a reversal, the decision represents a dramatic shift in
the Court's habeas jurisprudence. To explain how Martinez was consistent with Coleman, the Court found it necessary to create an entirely
new distinction that had never previously existed in habeas jurisprudence-the "initial-review collateral proceeding."' 8 ' This distinction
meant that attorney error in postconviction proceedings led to strikingly
different outcomes in the two cases. In Coleman, a prisoner facing execution was barred from federal habeas review because of his attorney's
error in collateral proceedings.1 8 2 In Martinez, the attorney's error on
177. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012).
178. Ibarra,687 F.3d at 229.
179. See, e.g., Marceau, Don't Forget Due Process, supra note 114, at 18 ("[D]ue process
mandates that every prisoner have at least one full and fair review of his constitutional claims, either
through direct or collateral proceedings, and either in state or federal court." (citing Wright v. West,
505 U.S. 277, 298-99 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring))).
180. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315.
Id. ("Coleman v. Thompson left open, and the Court of Appeals in this case addressed, a
181.
question of constitutional law: whether a prisoner has a right to effective counsel in collateral proceedings which provide the first occasion to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial. These
proceedings can be called, for purposes of this opinion, 'initial-review collateral proceedings."'
(citation omitted)).
182.
See supra Part I.D.
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collateral review provided an opportunity for the prisoner to raise the
claim in federal habeas court.' 83 Whereas Coleman focused on the importance of finality, Martinez focused on "ensur[ing] that proper consideration [be] given to a substantial claim."l 84 From the Court's emphasis
on providing a full and fair review on the merits rather than on prioritizing finality, it might seem that Martinez has ushered in a new era of
broader federal habeas review.
Nevertheless, the Coleman rule, that an attorney's mistake on appeal from an initial-review collateral proceeding does not constitute
cause for procedural default, still stands. Several federal court decisions
since Martinez have made clear that Coleman, not Martinez, governs
procedurally defaulted claims caused by attorney error beyond the initialreview collateral proceeding.' 85 The Eighth Circuit held in Arnold v.
Dormire'8 that Martinez did not apply when, like Coleman, the petitioner's claims were litigated in the initial-review collateral proceeding but
not preserved on appeal.' 87 The Arnold court reasoned that "unlike Martinez, Arnold has already had his day in court; deprivation of a second
day does not constitute cause."' 8 8 Federal district courts in Colorado and
Arizona have made similar rulings.'8 9
These decisions provide support for the Court's assurance that
"[t]he rule of Coleman governs in all but the limited circumstances" recognized in Martinez.'90 The decisions demonstrate that although Martinez represents a significant shift in the Court's habeas jurisprudence, its
application is constrained to a narrow class of proceedings. Unfortunately, the Coleman rule will still prevent many prisoners with defaulted
claims from accessing federal habeas review.
CONCLUSION
After decades of tightening restrictions on federal habeas review,
the Supreme Court in Martinez v. Ryan finally took a step toward broad183.
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315.
184.
Id. at 1318.
185.
Arnold v. Dormire, 675 F.3d 1082, 1087 (8th Cir. 2012); Cook v. Ryan, No. CV-9700146-PHX-RCB, 2012 WL 2798789, at *8 (D. Ariz. July 9, 2012); Wilkinson v. Timme, No. I1CV-00454-REB, 2012 WL 1884518, at *3 (D. Colo. May 23, 2012).
186. . 675 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 2012).
187.
Id. at 1087.
188.
Id.
189.
Cook, 2012 WL 2798789, at *8 ("Under the plain language of Martinez, post-conviction
counsel's failure to appeal the state court's denial of the ineffectiveness claims cannot constitute
cause for the procedural default because the Martinez exception does not extend to attorney errors
'beyond the first occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at
trial."' (quoting Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320)); Wilkinson, 2012 WL 1884518, at *3 ("With respect
to all of Mr. Wilkinson's ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Supreme Court held in a case
prior to Martinez that an attorney's errors on appeal from an initial-review collateral proceeding do
not qualify as cause for a procedural default." (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 757
(1991))).
190.
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320.

294

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1

ening access to federal habeas corpus. Martinez represents a shift away
from federalism and finality, the policy concerns that historically served
to close the courthouse doors to habeas petitioners. The holding provides
an avenue for habeas petitioners with inadequate counsel in a collateral
proceeding to overcome procedural default and have their claims heard
in federal court. The Court affirmed the importance of ensuring that prisoners receive at least one full and fair review of inadequate-assistanceof-trial-counsel claims and proved willing to open an avenue for federal
habeas review of those claims in limited circumstances. 19 1
If the Martinez holding allows more petitioners with meritorious
constitutional claims to have their day in court, then Martinez represents
a victory for constitutional rights. But although Martinez marks a landmark shift toward easing procedural barriers that keep prisoners from
accessing federal habeas review, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to guarantee that prisoners with vital constitutional claims will be
represented by counsel in collateral proceedings. Lower court decisions
narrowly interpreting Martinez have already demonstrated the limitations
of the Court's equitable ruling.19 2 Although Martinez represents a significant step toward ensuring that prisoners receive a full and fair review of
constitutional claims, prisoners without effective counsel still face significant challenges in vindicating their constitutional rights in federal habeas review.

Mary Dewey

191.
Id. at 1318-20.
192. See, e.g., lbarra v. Thaler, 687 F.3d 222, 227 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding Martinez inapplicable because Texas allows prisoners to raise ineffective assistance claims in a motion for new trial
and on direct appeal); Hunton v. Sinclair, No. CV-06-0054-FVS, 2012 WL 1409608, at *1 (E.D.
Wash. Apr. 23, 2012) (holding that Martinez applies only to ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claims and not to Brady claims); State v. Finn, No. 0801037592, 2012 WL 2905101, at *2 (Del.
Super. Ct. July 17, 2012) ("Martinez does not change Delaware's longstanding rule that defendants
are not entitled postconviction relief counsel.").
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